Federalism in Danger: Is India's Spine Being Bent?

Harish Bala

“Federalism is not a matter of administrative convenience. It is the recognition of India’s diversity.” — B. R. Ambedkar

Nations rarely collapse in a single dramatic moment. Democracies are gradually weakened through the slow concentration of power, the erosion of institutions, and the erosion of constitutional balance. The danger is not always visible immediately. It unfolds silently, piece by piece, until one day the foundations themselves begin to crack. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s book How Democracies Die observes, “Democracies may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders—presidents or prime ministers who subvert the very process that brought them to power. Some of these leaders dismantle democracy quickly, as Hitler did in the wake of the 1933 Reichstag fire in Germany. More often, though, democracies erode slowly, in barely visible steps.” India today faces such a moment.

India is not a monolithic nation-state built upon one language, one culture, or one identity. It is a civilisation of civilisations. From Tamil Nadu to Kerala, from Karnataka to the Northeast, every region possesses its own language, political consciousness, social history, and cultural traditions. What binds this extraordinary diversity together is not forced uniformity, but the constitutional principle of federalism. Federalism is not merely an administrative arrangement. It is the spine that holds India together.

The framers of the Constitution understood this deeply. During the Constituent Assembly debates, several leaders warned against excessive centralisation. At the Meerut Session of 1946, J. B. Kripalani argued that India’s Constitution must guarantee substantial autonomy to states. When B. R. Ambedkar introduced the Draft Constitution, he described India as federal in structure, even though the word “federal” did not explicitly appear in the text.

At the same time, the trauma of Partition convinced the framers that the Centre needed sufficient strength to preserve national unity. The result was a carefully balanced arrangement—a federal Constitution with unitary features. Article 1 declared India a “Union of States,” not a loose confederation. States could not secede, but neither were they intended to become administrative colonies of New Delhi.

To preserve this balance, powers were divided through the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. States were entrusted with key subjects such as public health, law and order, agriculture, and local governance. This division was not accidental; it was the constitutional recognition that India could survive only by respecting regional diversity. But today, that constitutional balance appears increasingly fragile.

Fiscal Federalism Under Strain

Over the last decade, India has witnessed an unmistakable trend toward political and financial centralization. The Union government has steadily expanded its control over areas historically reserved for states, weakening both fiscal autonomy and democratic functioning. One of the most visible examples is the Goods and Services Tax (GST). GST was promoted as a revolutionary reform designed to create “One Nation, One Tax.” While simplifying taxation was a legitimate objective, the reform fundamentally altered India’s federal structure. States surrendered significant taxation powers and became dependent on the Centre for compensation and revenue-sharing. This has produced enormous resentment, especially among economically productive southern states.

According to repeated statements by the Tamil Nadu government, for every ₹1 contributed by Tamil Nadu to the Union government, the state receives only around 29 paise in return. By contrast, states such as Bihar reportedly receive more than ₹7 for every rupee contributed. Tamil Nadu contributes nearly 9.4 per cent of India’s GDP but receives barely 4 per cent of central tax devolution. Similar concerns have been raised by Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana, and Maharashtra.

The issue is not opposition to helping poorer states. Wealthier states have historically accepted redistribution as part of national solidarity. The deeper grievance is that states that successfully controlled population growth, invested in education, industrialised efficiently, and improved governance are increasingly being penalised for their success.

The problem worsened because the Union government increasingly relied on cesses and surcharges—revenues that are not shared with states through the divisible tax pool. Even as Finance Commissions formally increased states’ share of taxes, the Centre expanded collections through mechanisms that bypassed revenue-sharing obligations. 

Governors as Central Government Brokers 

Financial dependence inevitably produces political dependence. This is where the office of the Governor has emerged as one of the most controversial features of modern Indian federalism. Governors were originally intended to function as neutral constitutional authorities. Increasingly, however, they are accused of acting as political instruments of the Union government.

The confrontation between former Lieutenant Governor Kiran Bedi and Chief Minister V. Narayanasamy became a defining example. Narayanasamy repeatedly accused Kiran Bedi of bypassing the elected government, interfering directly in administration, and obstructing welfare schemes. Cabinet decisions were allegedly delayed or overridden, creating a situation where an unelected constitutional authority appeared more powerful than the elected government itself.

A similar constitutional confrontation unfolded in Tamil Nadu between Governor R. N. Ravi and Chief Minister M. K. Stalin. Governor Ravi delayed assent to multiple bills passed by the legislature and frequently clashed publicly with the elected government. The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Governors cannot indefinitely delay bills and must act within a reasonable timeframe.

More recently, controversy intensified when Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar reportedly denied the single largest party, Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), the opportunity to form a government. Such incidents reinforce fears that constitutional offices are increasingly being used to influence political outcomes. But the greatest anxiety in southern India today concerns delimitation.

Delimitation as Damocles Sword 

The proposed delimitation exercise has triggered fears that southern states may lose political influence despite their economic contributions and demographic achievements. Officially, the Union government insists that no southern state will lose seats. However, critics argue that the issue is not merely about absolute seat numbers, but about proportional political power.

Under current discussions, the Lok Sabha could expand dramatically—from 543 seats to nearly 816 or even 850 seats. Since delimitation is tied to population, northern states with higher population growth stand to gain substantially larger representation. Reports suggest that southern states together may increase from around 129 seats to 195 seats. But the rest of India—primarily the northern states—would gain far more, potentially reaching over 620 seats. This means that while southern states may gain seats numerically, their share of parliamentary influence could decline significantly.

For example, Tamil Nadu currently holds around 7.18 per cent of Lok Sabha seats. Under several projected models, its share could decline to below 7 per cent despite gaining additional seats numerically. Meanwhile, states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar could dramatically increase their overall influence in Parliament. According to analyses discussed widely in policy circles, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar combined could eventually command over 220 Lok Sabha seats—more than the combined representation of several southern states. This creates a profound constitutional dilemma.

Southern states successfully implemented population control policies for decades. Tamil Nadu and Kerala reduced fertility rates, improved literacy, expanded healthcare, and invested heavily in human development. Ironically, these achievements may now reduce their political influence if parliamentary representation is tied strictly to population growth. Critics argue that this effectively punishes states for good governance while rewarding demographic expansion elsewhere. The political consequences are enormous.

If northern states gain overwhelming parliamentary dominance, national politics may increasingly revolve around the Hindi heartland.

Political parties could focus disproportionately on electorally dominant northern states while ignoring southern concerns. Resource allocation, policy priorities, language politics, and economic decisions may increasingly reflect northern majoritarian interests. This is precisely why opposition parties fiercely resisted the recent delimitation-linked proposals in Parliament. The BJP government’s attempt to advance delimitation alongside women’s reservation legislation faced strong resistance and was ultimately defeated after opposition parties united against it. Southern parties viewed the proposal not merely as administrative reform, but as a structural attempt to permanently alter the balance of Indian federalism.

Regional parties have historically acted as the strongest defenders of federalism. Whether it was the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu, regional socialist movements in Bihar, or linguistic movements in Andhra Pradesh, regional parties ensured that India remained politically decentralised. Today, however, many of these regional formations appear weakened, fragmented, or politically absorbed.

The split within Shiv Sena in Maharashtra became one of the most dramatic examples. After Eknath Shinde’s rebellion and subsequent alliance with the BJP, critics argued that a major regional force had effectively been divided and politically neutralised. In Bihar, Nitish Kumar repeatedly shifted alliances, eventually enabling arrangements that strengthened the BJP's influence in the state. Critics argue that regional political independence has steadily eroded.

Similarly, the post-Jayalalithaa period witnessed severe fragmentation within All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Leadership crisis, factional struggles, and growing dependence on alliances with the BJP significantly altered the nature of Dravidian politics. Many opposition leaders now argue that the weakening or splitting of regional parties is not accidental but part of a broader political strategy to centralize power nationally.

Whether one accepts this argument fully or not, the pattern is difficult to ignore: financial centralization, gubernatorial intervention, weakening regional parties, and delimitation proposals that could structurally reduce southern influence. Taken together, these developments raise uncomfortable questions about the future of Indian federalism.

A country as diverse as India cannot survive through excessive centralisation. Diversity requires negotiation, accommodation, and decentralisation. Federalism is not an obstacle to national unity—it is the very reason national unity has survived. The solution is not weakening the Union government. India requires a strong Centre for national security, economic coordination, and constitutional stability. But strength must coexist with balance.

The GST structure must be redesigned to restore genuine fiscal autonomy to states. The excessive use of cesses and surcharges must be reconsidered. Revenue-sharing mechanisms should reward both equity and performance rather than penalising economically successful states. The office of Governor requires urgent reform. Governors cannot become parallel political authorities overriding elected governments.

Most importantly, delimitation must be approached with extraordinary caution. Representation cannot be reduced to raw population arithmetic alone. If states that controlled population growth lose political influence while others gain disproportionate power, the constitutional compact underlying Indian federalism may begin to fracture. India’s unity has survived because its diversity was respected, not erased.

Federalism is the bridge that transforms difference into democracy. Weakening it is not merely an administrative shift. It is a challenge to the very idea of India itself.